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INTRODUCTION
A new and exciting breed of the grand jury system has
emerged in East Asia: Japan introduced the revised system of
Prosecution Review Commissions (“PRCs”) in 2009 and the
People’s Republic of China implemented the System of People’s
Supervisor in 2010. Contrary to the United States’ grand jury
system, which has often been criticized as the government’s
rubber stamp institution or even labeled as the “laughingstock”
of US criminal procedure,1 these two new citizen panels adopted
in two of the most powerful countries in East Asia have begun to
transform their legal landscape by giving ordinary people the
authority to monitor and check government and corporate
decisions and activities. These oversight institutions have also
begun to initiate forced prosecution of unethical actions and
illegal conduct of government officials, industrialists, economic
elites, and even foreign soldiers stationed in the country.
The structure of this Article is as follows. Part I examines
Japan’s revised PRC system and how its implementation
facilitated the forced prosecution of a political powerbroker,
past presidents of Japan’s powerful corporations, a government
bureaucrat, and US military personnel stationed in Japan. The
historical genealogy of China’s People’s Supervisor System
(“PSS”) is the focus of Part II. Part III examines specific criminal
cases reviewed and assessed by the grand juries in both countries.
Beginning in the early 1990s, many East and Central Asian
1. Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV., 2333, 2352
(2008).
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countries began to introduce a new system of lay participation in
criminal justice procedure. Active participation of citizens in the
justice system and the new civic oversight of government
agencies and corporate elites can lead to even further
transparency of judicial systems in East Asia. Part IV then
examines the socio-political ramifications of these new systems
in Japan and China and makes critical suggestions to improve
the representativeness of civic panels and the quality of their
deliberations.
I. HISTORICAL GENEALOGY OF THE PRCS IN JAPAN
A. The Evolution of Japan’s PRC and Its Development
The birth of Japan’s grand jury system began with the
occupation of the Japanese islands by the Allied Forces
immediately following the end of World War II (“WWII”) in
1945. Through the joint collaborative work of the Japanese
government and the Allied Forces represented by the US
government, the civilian review commission was established by
the passage of the Prosecutorial Review Commission Law on July
12, 1948.2 The PRC is the Japanese version of a US-style grand
jury system. As the leader of the office of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (the “SCAP”) occupying
Japan after WWII, General Douglas McArthur saw the grand jury
as an important democratic institution for engaging the public
whose rights had been deliberately neglected by the Japanese
government until the end of WWII.
The original proposal to establish the grand jury system in
Japan was specified in the Proposed Revision of Code of
Criminal Procedure, written by Captain Maniscalco of the Legal
Section, Public Safety Division of the SCAP in 1946. 3 This
proposal also included the provision to introduce the petit jury
in Japan, although Japan already had its own system of jury trial
2. Kensatsu Shinsakai Ho [Prosecution Review Commission Law], Law No. 147 of
1948, art. 4 (Japan) [hereinafter PRC Law].
3. ANNA DOBROVOLSKAIA, JAPAN’S PAST EXPERIENCES WITH THE INSTITUTION OF
JURY SERVICE, 48–49 n.233 (2010) (unpublished manuscript on file with East Asia Law
Review) (discussing the history of revisions of implementing both the grand and petit
jury system in Japan). The paper was presented at the Inaugural East Asia Law and
Society Conference in Hong Kong in February 2010.
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that began in 1928 but was suspended in 1943 due to the war.4
The second attempt to establish the grand jury system was
included in the informal directive from the SCAP to the
Japanese government, and the draft of the new Court
Organization Law was given to the Japanese side by Alfred C.
Oppler, Chief Officer of the Legal Unit, Governmental Powers
Division, in 1947.5
Specifically, Article 227 of the proposed revised code of
criminal procedure stated that:
[N]o accused shall be made to answer (stand public action)
for any crime the penalty for which may be confinement for
one year or more, or for life, or an indefinite period, or
death, unless an indictment or presentment made by a
grand jury,” followed by the note that “Rules governing
selection, session etc. of grand juries should be
promulgated.6

Article 228 also specified, “[n]o indictment shall be found, nor
shall presentment be made, without the concurrence of at least
ten jurors (of a panel of 12).”7 However, Captain Maniscalco’s
proposal was submitted to the Japanese government as a private
draft, and his provisions regarding the jury system were not
formally included as part of the final draft of the official SCAP
recommendation.8
It is important to note that there was a significant
difference of opinions among the various sections of the SCAP
on the recommendations of civic participation systems. Legal
specialist Anna Dobrovolskaia indicated that Alfred C. Oppler
and his associate Thomas L. Blakemore became highly critical of
Maniscalco’s proposals, expressing their grave concerns about
the unilateral, authoritative imposition of the US lay
participation system on post-war Japan. 9 Blakemore, in
particular, had a unique perspective on Japanese legal ethos and
See DOBROLSKAIA, supra note 3, at 48 n.231.
Id. at 48 n.231.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 50 n.240.
Id. at 50 n.241 (citing NOBUYOSHI TOSHITANI, SENGO KAIKAKU TO KOKUMIN NO
SHIHO SANKA [POST-WAR REFORMS AND PEOPLE’S JUSTICE [SYSTEM] PARTICIPATION],
127 (1975)) (discussing this draft as a document prepared by Captain Maniscalco in
the private capacity).
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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culture, as he had formerly studied Japanese law in pre-war
Japan at the Tokyo Imperial University. After Blakemore
graduated from the University of Oklahoma, he received a grant
to study in Japan and came to Tokyo in 1939 as a student of
international law and language.10 After he passed the Japanese
bar exam, he was also admitted to practice law with full
courtroom status in Japan.11
Blakemore returned to Japan as the Chief of Civil Affairs
and Civil Liberties Branch, Legislation, and Justice Division,
Legal Section under the SCAP. Blakemore proposed a radically
different version of the US grand jury system to his Japanese
counterpart.12 As Blakemore was highly critical of Maniscalco’s
original proposal, his new proposal laid the foundation for the
creation of the PRC, in order to check and even challenge the
prosecution’s discretion when it decides not to prosecute.13
Blakemore’s proposed model radically departed from the
traditional Anglo-American criminal grand jury system. Rather
than relying on people’s discretion to make an indictment
decision based on prosecutorial evidence, the chief function of
Japan’s counterpart is to allow Japanese citizens to review a
prosecutor’s “failure” to indict criminal suspects. In other
words, Japan’s proposed grand jury panel was designed to
function as the people’s effective oversight institution for
prosecutors’ decisions and investigative authorities. Given the
fact that nearly one hundred percent of all indictments lead to
conviction in Japan,14 the PRC’s ex post facto review of nonindictment decisions became quite significant in checking any
potential governmental abuse and misuse of power and
authority.

10. Mary F. Pols, Thomas Blakemore Spent His Life Connecting America and Japan,
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 1, 1994, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.
com/archive/?date=19940301&slug=1897785 (recounting Blakemore’s life and
influence on Japan).
11 . JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
PARADOX 126 n.12 (1991).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So
High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53 (2001) (“Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99
percent.”).
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Thanks to Blakemore’s suggestion to create the effective
civic oversight of governmental actions, the PRC became a
powerful hybrid institution, which more or less mirrored the
United States’ civil grand jury as exercised in the State of
California. The civil grand jury is empanelled every year at every
county in California to examine civic complaints against
government officials. The grand jury also inspects the actions
and decision of public personnel and the proper management
of local government offices, including the school board, the
public library, the prosecutor’s office, the police department,
and local jails.15 Similar to the US criminal grand jury, the PRC
also has influence on decisions to indict.16
Ever since the PRC was established at 201 locations
throughout Japan in 1948, the PRC has deliberated on a total of
162,233 cases (as of December 31, 2012).17 Not only has the PRC
deliberated on many controversial political issues, but its
examination has also extended to prominent white-collar crimes
and allegations of egregious governmental misconduct related
to deaths, injuries, torts, and other sensitive health-related
matters. 18 For example, the PRC’s examination has covered
cases such as the Japan Airlines Flight 123 crash,19 the Snow

15. See generally Hiroshi Fukurai, The Proposal to Establish the System of the
Federal Civil Grand Jury in America (May 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
16. Editorial, Keeping an Eye on Prosecution, JAPAN TIMES, May 19, 2009, http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2009/05/19/editorials/keeping-an-eye-on-prosecution
/#.UzPOi61dXt8.
17. Supreme Court of Japan, Kensatsu Shinsakai no Juri Kensu: Giketsu Kensuto
[Accepted Case Total by Prosecution Review Commission and Total Number of
Deliberation] (2013), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/vcms_lf/kensintoukei
H24.pdf.
18. See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan’s Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury
Systems: A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory Experience
in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 315, 349–53 (2007) (discussing how Japan’s
HIV contamination incident is historically rooted in the germ and biological warfare
experiments conducted by Unit 731 military doctors during WWII, who later played
prominent roles in the development of Japan’s pharmaceutical industries and the
formulation of health-related government policies).
19. Shouwashi Saibo-Nikko Janboki Tuiraku Jiken [Revisit Showa’s History: Japan Airline
Crash], ASAHI DIGITAL (Aug. 12, 1985, 9:38 AM), http://www.asahi.com/culture/
articles/TKY201308030404.html.
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Brand mass food poisoning case, 20 the Minamata mercury
poisoning incident, an organ transplant from a brain dead
donor,21 thalidomide scandals,22 incidents where hemophiliacs
contracted HIV from contaminated blood products, 23 druginduced sufferings of millions of Japanese who contracted the
Hepatitis C virus from unheated pharmaceutical products
previously approved by the government,24 and illegal campaign
donations and political bribery.25 The PRC also deliberated on
international cases, such as a collision incident between Japan
Coast Guard patrol vessels and a Chinese fishing trawler in the
much-disputed territorial waters of the Senkakku Islands,26 and
murders of Japanese citizens by on-duty American military
personnel, thereby assessing the propriety of prosecuting
foreign soldiers in Japanese court.27
The PRC investigates its cases and has the power to
summon petitioners, their proxies, and witnesses for
examination; question prosecutors, asking them for additional
information when necessary; and seek special expert advice on a
given case.28 The investigative function only begins after a public
complaint is filed against a prosecutor’s decision not to indict.
20. Prosecutors Hit in Snow Probe: Failure to Indict Execs Prompts Inquest Report Barbs,
JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2002/04/26/national/
prosecutors-hit-in-snow-probe/#.U2UOOq1dUqY.
21 . Mayumi Negishi, Legal Restrictions, Donor Card Problems Hinder Organ
Transplants, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998.
22 . Kensatsushinsakai ni Tsuite, 4, Kensatsu Shinsakai Toriatsukaishinsajikensū to
Omona Yūmeijiken [Numbers of PRC Deliberations and Famous Cases], http://www.rui.jp/
ruinet.html?=200&c=400&m=246309 (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
23 . Yukio Edano, Yakugai Eizujiken no Kensatsu Shinsakai ‘Fukisofuto’ Giketsuni
Kansuru Shitsumon Shuisho [Main Questions Regarding PRC’s “Non-Indictment is Improper”
Resolution on HIV Phytotoxicity Cases], SHITSUMON HONBUN JOHO [INFO. ON CONTENT OF
INQUIRIES] (Dec. 17, 1996), http://www.shugiin.go.jp/Internet/itdb_shitsumona.nsf/
html/shitsumon/a139007.htm.
24. Fukurai, supra note 18, at 349–53.
25. Id. at 347–49.
26. Motonari Imaseki, The Increased Power of Committees for the Inquest of Prosecution:
The Implications of ‘Not Guilty’ Judgments in Mandatory Indictment Cases, YOMIURI
SHIMBUN, Apr. 1, 2013, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/wol/dy/opinion/society_
130401.htm.
27. Hiroshi Fukurai, Lay Prosecution of U.S. Military Crimes in Japan by Prosecutorial
Review Commissions and the Saiban-in Trial, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN ERA OF
TRANSITION 131 (Tom Ginsburg & Harry Scheiber eds., 2012).
28. Keijisoshōhōtō no ichibu o kaiseisuruhōritsu [Act to Revise the Code of
Criminal Procedure], Law No. 62 of 2004, art. 38 (Japan) [hereinafter PRC Act],
available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO147.html.
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Individuals and civic organizations are empowered to file these
complaints to launch an investigation of prosecutorial decisions
in criminal matters.
The PRC deliberates on the case and submits one of three
recommendations: (1) the non-indictment is proper, supporting
the prosecutor’s original decision; (2) the non-indictment is
improper, questioning and challenging the prosecutor’s
decision; or (3) the indictment is proper, reversing the
prosecutor’s non-indictment decision. A simple majority is
needed for either of the first two decisions, while a
supermajority of at least eight of the eleven votes is needed to
pass the third resolution. The PRC then delivers a written
recommendation to the Prosecutor’s Office. In the past, because
the Prosecutor’s Office was the only institution with the power
to indict, the PRC’s recommendations were regarded as
advisory. This limited legal authority was finally expanded by the
2004 Act to Revise the Code of Criminal Procedure (“PRC
Act”), which made PRCs decisions legally binding.29
Since nearly all indictments issued by Japanese prosecutors
result in conviction, the most likely abuse of prosecutorial power
lies in the exercise of the discretion not to prosecute potential
suspects or criminals. The prosecutor’s refusal to issue
indictments may be influenced by extra-judicial pressures from
prominent politicians, governmental leaders, economic elites, or
other corporate leaders in the commercial and governmental
establishment. The PRC’s power to review and challenge the
prosecutor’s non-indictment decision has become a potential
tool of the citizenry to ensure the proper functioning of
powerful corporations, local and central government agencies,
and their officials.
B. The Impact of the 2004 PRC Act and Legally Binding Authority
Ever since the Prosecution Review Commission Law (“PRC
Law”) was put into practice in 1948, the Japanese Federation of
Bar Associations (the “JFBA”) has insisted that a PRC decision
be given legally binding authority, instead of treating it as a
mere advisement to the Japanese prosecutor. In order to make a
strong case for their recommendation, the JFBA first decided to
29. Id. art. 41(6)(1).
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create the Internal Investigative Committee in 1973. 30 The
Committee finally submitted its recommendation to the JFBA
headquarters, which then released its report in 1975.31
Committee Chair Kashitaro Idei declared in his report that
“citizens’ direct participation in the justice system promotes the
democratization of the judiciary, and any proposal to develop
and strengthen the power of the PRCs system becomes an
integral part of democratic efforts.” 32 Chair Idei’s report
indicated that the second PRC decision to indict should be
legally binding. Specifically, the recommendations indicated
that after the PRC decides that “the indictment was proper” or
“the non-indictment was improper,” the prosecutor is required
to determine whether or not to maintain their non-indictment
decision and then respond to the PRC recommendation within
three months. If the prosecutor once again decided not to indict
the suspect, the prosecutor is required to explain the reason for
their non-indictment decision to the PRC.33 If the PRC is not
persuaded by the prosecutor’s explanation and determines that
the suspect should still be indicted for the given case, its second
indictment decision becomes binding.34 The report concludes
that prosecutors must respect the PRC decision and initiate a
public action against the accused.
The committee report also included the special voting rule
and suggested that a two-thirds majority was sufficient for the
second indictment decision. Additionally, the report suggested a
new deliberative structure for the PRC and the replacement of
the quota system with a quorum rule. The PRC Law required
that the deliberative forum must consist of eleven members. The
forum often failed to meet its required quota for deliberation
because PRC members often faced work-related obligations,
transportation difficulties, economic hardship, needs of care for
children or sick family members, and/or other personal
difficulties. The JFBA thus recommended that the size of the
30. JAPANESE FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, KENSATSU SHINSAKAI SEIDO NO KAISEIAN:SONO
JŪJITSU KYŌKA WO MEZASHITE [THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE PROSECUTORIAL
REVIEW COMMISSION: TO ENRICH AND STRENGTHEN] (1975).
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1.
Id. at “Jobun” [Introduction].
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29.
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PRC be expanded from eleven to fifteen, and that the PRC
adopt a quorum rule so that the attendance of any eleven
members would constitute a quorum for full deliberative
discussions and decisions.35
In consideration of the three options for the PRC’s final
decision, the report recommended that two of them, specifically
“the indictment is proper” and “the non-indictment is
improper,” should be treated equally, and the passage of this
first PRC indictment decision should require a special two-thirds
vote (i.e., at least eight of eleven votes). A second decision
regarding the indictment then requires a two-thirds majority of
the newly constituted fifteen members, which means that at least
ten votes are needed to make the indictment legally binding.36
Unfortunately, none of the JFBA’s recommendations were
introduced into the legislative process, and its recommendations
for strengthening the PRC and its power to reverse the
prosecutorial decision were not discussed until the late 1990s. A
window of opportunity to revise the PRC Law came again when
the Justice System Reform Council (the “JSRC”) was created in
1999, and it began to discuss the introduction of another lay
justice institution, the quasi-jury system, called a Saiban-in Seido.37
It is important to note that the revision of the PRC Law was
never the primary objective of the JSRC’s discussions. Attorney
Shunsuke Marushima, who once served as Senior Staff of the
Secretariat in the JSRC, argued that many of the reforms in the
criminal justice system, especially with respect to prosecution
and police procedures, were expected to go through significant
and perhaps unprecedented levels of procedural and
administrative changes because of ordinary citizens’
participation in Saiban-in trials, but not the PRC deliberation.38
For instance, the effort to revise the PRC Law was first

35. Id. at 16–17.
36. Id. at 18–19.
37. Hiroshi Fukurai, People’s Panel vs. Imperial Hegemony: Japan’s Twin Lay Justice
Systems and the Future of American Military Bases in Japan, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 95,
123–24 (2010).
38 . Shunsuke Marushima, Historical Genealogy of Japan’s Judicial Reform: Its
Achievement and Challenges, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 349, 357 (2013).
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mentioned in the JSRC’s seventh meeting in November 1999.39
However, it took another year and a half to have the second
discussion on the revision of the PRC Law. On April 10, 2001,
the fifty-fifth meeting finally discussed the PRC reform and
evaluated different strategies and proposals from the JSRC, the
JFBA, the Supreme Court, and the Ministry of Justice. JSRC
members proposed to make two decisions—“non-indictment is
improper” and “indictment is proper”—legally binding. 40
However, the Ministry of Justice recommended that only the
resolution of “indictment is proper” should be given legally
binding authority, while the Supreme Court recommended that
the resolution of “non-indictment is improper,” should be
binding when the decision is unanimous. The JFBA’s proposal
indicated that the PRC’s indictment decision should be legally
binding and subject to a two-thirds voting requirement and that
the PRC deliberation should also be assisted by a practicing
attorney as a legal advisor.41
The final JSRC proposal made a strong pitch for the
revision of the PRC Law, stating that “a system should be
introduced that grants legally binding effect to certain
resolutions . . . in order to further expand the role of those
Inquests [i.e., PRC], after thoroughly considering the structure,
authority and procedures . . . as well as who files the indictment
and conducts the prosecution at trial.”42 The Lay Assessor/Penal
Matter Investigation Committee (the “Penal Matter
Committee”) was soon empanelled to undertake the actual
revision of the PRC Law. Committee Chairman Masahito Inoue
first presented a detailed outline, suggesting that the PRC’s
39. Shih9, 357 kaikaku shingikai: Dai 7 kai giji gaiy [JSRC: No. 7 Proceeding
Outline] (Nov. 24 1999), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/991126
dai7.html.
40. Shihleido kaikaku shingikai: Dai 55 kai giji gaiy [JSRC: No. 55 Proceeding
Outline] (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai55/
55gaiyou.html.
41. Kensat sushinsakai no itteino giketsu ni taishi haishi kaishi i o fuyshi tameno
hameno: Hame sansha no iken no hikaku [The Strategy to Provide a Legally
Mandatory Status to a Particular Resolution by the PRC: Comparisons of Three Legal
Professional Groups] (Apr. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Strategy], available at http://
www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai55/55bessi2.html.
42. Justice Sys. Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform
Council: For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century (2001), available
athttp://japan.kantei.go.jp/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.
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decision be legally binding and that a practicing attorney be
included as a legal advisor. 43 The PRC foreperson was then
advised to specify the nature of a legal advisor’s support,
including the explanation of legal issues, relevant evidence, and
case-specific information to be considered in the deliberation.44
Public opinion and feedback on the Committee’s proposals
and guidelines were solicited in April and May 2003.45 Many
grassroots activists and concerned citizens sent their opinions
and suggestions to the committee website. In July, public
suggestions, concerns, and recommendations were published in
a 293-page report on the government website.46 Some citizens
complained about the failure to recruit a sufficient number of
lay participants for the commission to convene47 and the PRC’s
automatic disqualification of vision or hearing impaired
candidates. 48 A woman from Tokyo suggested the need for
serious media efforts to publicize the PRC and its duty more
broadly.49 A man in his thirties from Tokyo also suggested that
the legally binding authority should only be granted if another
PRC panel that deliberated on the same case reached the same
conclusion.50
The institutional response was equally strong. Regional bar
associations in Osaka, Kagoshima, Kyushu, Tokyo, Nagasaki,
Nagasaki, Fukuoka, and Kyoto submitted their opinions,
detailed proposals, and recommendations for the PRC reform.51
Other organizations sending their suggestions and proposals
43. Chairman Inouye submitted his outline for reform on November 11, 2003.
Kangaerareru Kensatsu Shinsakai Seido Kaisei no Gaiyo ni Tsuite [The Outline on the
PRC’s Reform to Consider] (Nov. 11, 2003), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai29/29siryou1.pdf.
44. Id. at 2–3.
45. Office for the Promotion of Justice Sys. Reform, Saiban-in Seido oyobi
Kensatsu Shinsakai Seido ni Tsuiteno Ikenboshu no Kekka ni tsuite [Results of Public
Opinions on the Lay Assessor and PRC Systems] (July 2003), available at http://
www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/siryou/0307kekka.html.
46. Saiban-in seido oyobi kensatsu shinsakai ni tsuiteno iken boshu no kekka gaiyo
[Resulting outlines of public opinions on the lay assessor and PRC systems] 9 (July
2003), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai22/
22siryou1.pdf.
47. Id. at 327.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 159.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 176.
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included the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the
Japanese Housewives Association (the Shufuren), the Burakumin
Liberation League (the Buraku Kaiho Domei), the National
Consumer Groups Liaison Committee, the Tokyo Headquarters
of the Women’s Conference (the Joshi Kaigi), the Japan
Broadcasting Union, the Japan Commercial Broadcasters
Association, the Japan Federation of Certified Administrative
Procedures Legal Specialists Associations, teachers’ unions in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the All Judicial Labor Union (the
Zenshijo Rodokumiai), and many other powerful and prominent
organizations.52 Legal scholars and research institutes also sent
their specific suggestions and proposals, including the Research
Committee in Criminal Justice at the Nippon University School
of Law. 53 The majority of these organizations supported the
granting of legally binding authority to the PRC’s resolution.
The JFBA and the Citizens Committee for the Creation of a Lay
Assessor System, an influential civic group, opposed and
criticized any proposal to impose a penalty on PRCs members
for divulging case-specific information, but both strongly
supported the idea that the PRCs’ resolutions should be legally
binding. 54 The Penal Matter Committee reviewed and
incorporated the public comments and submitted its final
recommendation. The PRC Law was then finally revised on May
28, 2004.55
The revised law created a two-step process by which a PRC
resolution would be made legally binding. When prosecutors
issue a decision not to indict in a given case and the PRC
decides that indictment is in fact appropriate, prosecutors are
obliged to reconsider their non-indictment decision. If
prosecutors decide for a second time not to prosecute, or if they
do not indict within three months, the prosecutors will be asked
to explain their inaction or non-indictment decision to the
commission.56 The PRC will then reconsider the case and if it
makes a decision to indict, this decision becomes legally

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
PRC Act, supra note 28.
Id. art. 41(2)(2), (6)(2).
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binding.57 The court also appoints an attorney to perform the
prosecution’s role until a ruling is reached, 58 but the actual
instruction to investigate authorities will be entrusted to
prosecutors.59
The revised law also requires that a practicing attorney is
appointed as a “legal advisor” when the PRC decides that legal
knowledge and advice is necessary.60 The role of a legal advisor
becomes particularly relevant in the second step of the process,
when the commission may need to reevaluate the prosecutors’
second refusal to issue the indictment against the accused.61
Finally, in order to streamline the operation, the PRC Law
reduced the number of commissions from 201 to 165.62 While
Japan was going through their own judicial reform and revising
the PRC Law, China was undertaking similar steps to create and
implement their own system of grand juries.
II. HISTORICAL GENEALOGY OF CHINA’S PEOPLE’S
SUPERVISORS SYSTEM AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
A. The Evolution of China’s PSS and Its Development
The original purpose of the PSS was to establish a system of
external supervision over China’s Procuratorates or prosecutors
in the investigation of criminal cases in their jurisdiction. Article
3 of the Criminal Procedural Law provides that police organs
shall be responsible for criminal investigation, detention,
execution of arrests, and preliminary inquiry in criminal cases,
while the People’s Procuratorates shall be responsible for
prosecutorial work such as authorizing approval of arrests and
conducting criminal investigation of cases directly accepted by
the Procuratorates. Under this provision, these two organs are
vested with separate criminal investigative powers, while the
57. Id. art. 41(6)(1).
58. Id. art. 41(9)(1).
59. Id. art. 41(9)(3).
60. Id.
61. Id. art. 41(4) (requiring by law that the PRC has assistance of a legal advisor
when considering the second resolution of the same case).
62. Supreme Court of Japan, Kensatsu Shisakai: Kensatsu Shinskai Seido Q&A
[PRC & PRC System, Q&A] (2010), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/kensin/q_a/
q3/index.html.
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majority of ordinary criminal cases have been investigated by the
police.
According to Article 18 of the Criminal Procedural Law,
China’s Procuratorates have the authority to investigate certain
kinds of criminal offenses, including embezzlement and bribery,
dereliction of duty committed by State functionaries, and
violations of a citizen’s personal rights such as illegal detention,
extortion of confessions by torture, retaliation, entrapment, and
illegal search. 63 The Procuratorates also investigate crimes
involving the infringement of a citizen’s democratic rights by
government personnel who take advantage of their authority
and power. These crimes are classified as “duty crimes.” While
Chinese police organs accept and investigate normal criminal
cases, Procuratorates are specifically empowered to investigate
these duty crime cases.
Article 8 of the Criminal Procedural Law also provides that
“the Procuratorates in China shall, in accordance with law,
exercise legal supervision over criminal proceedings.” In
accordance with this provision, the Procuratorates are
empowered to supervise the overall criminal investigation. In
terms of normal criminal cases investigated by police organs, the
Procuratorates supervise their investigation as well. However,
with respect to the investigation of duty crimes, the
Procuratorates exercise the discretion to accept and investigate
alleged duty crimes. The Procuratorates are then required to
supervise their own investigative activities, thereby creating what

63. [The Criminal Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., July 7, 1979, effective January 1, 1980; amended in accordance with the
Decision on Revising the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China,
adopted at the Forth Session of the Eighth National People's Congress on March 17,
1996), art. 18 (China). Article 18 of the Criminal Procedure Law of China provides that
crimes of embezzlement and bribery, crimes of dereliction of duty committed by State
functionaries, and crimes involving violations of a citizen’s personal rights such as
illegal detention, extortion of confessions by torture, retaliation, frame-up, and illegal
search and crimes involving infringement of a citizen’s democratic rights—committed
by State functionaries by taking advantage of their functions and powers—shall be
placed on file for investigation by the People’s Procuratorates. If cases involving other
grave crimes committed by State functionaries by taking advantage of their functions
and powers need be handled directly by the People’s Procuratorates, they may be
placed on file for investigation by the People’s Procuratorates upon decision by the
People’s Procuratorates at or above the provincial level.
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the Procuratorates of China called the “self-supervision
problem.”64
In order to eliminate this dilemma, many Procuratorates
have established an internal supervisory mechanism. For
example, they have created a so-called “Department of the DutyCrime Investigation” in charge of solely examining duty crimes
in its jurisdiction. Another department, named the
“Investigation Supervisory Department,” then conducts the
direct supervision of this department’s investigation of duty
crimes, as well as other normal crimes that were also investigated
by the police. This “internal supervision” of duty crime
investigations in the same Procuratorate division may give rise to
serious ethical concerns about the efficacy of institutional
transparency and effectiveness of supervision because the power
of prosecution without proper supervision may inevitably lead to
misuse and abuse. The absence of an independent oversight
committee has already led some prosecutorial personnel to
commit various forms of misconduct during the process of
criminal investigation, including illegal detention and extortion
of confessions by torture.65
In this context, the PSS was finally introduced by the
Chinese government, attempting to place the Procuratorates’
criminal investigations under external supervision by a select
group of citizens chosen from the local community. China’s
authorities expected that the PSS could serve and function as a
new normative supervisory mechanism and offer a more rigid
and transparent procedure of duty crime investigations.
The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China in 2002 first introduced the proposal to initiate judicial
reform in China. This proposal was, in part, the state’s response
to extensive media attention on people’s concerns about the
fairness and justice of law enforcement by the Procuratorates. A
poll initiated by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (the
“SPC”) pointed to the instances of injustice and
inappropriateness in the investigation of numerous duty crimes

64. Jiao Youlong, The Supervisory Power Needs to be Supervised, 2 PEOPLE’S CONGRESS
RES. 16 (2004).
65. Id.
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conducted by the Procuratorates.66 At the same time, the SPC
contended that some negative opinions and remarks about the
Procuratorates could be attributed to the public’s
misunderstandings of the nature of the investigative process and
procedure. The SPC then decided to introduce the PSS as an
external organ to monitor the Procuratorates’ duty crime
investigations. 67 After reporting to the National People’s
Congress (the “NPC”), the Supreme Procuratorate held the
“Meeting on the Experimental Work of the People’s Supervisor
System” in Beijing on August 29, 2003, and officially decided to
introduce the PSS.68
The PSS was thus expected to externally monitor and
oversee the discretion of investigative power of prosecutorial
personnel and their activity. The extensive supervision of
prosecutorial conduct and decisions by a select group of citizens
was expected to prevent procedural misconduct in law
enforcement and even the miscarriage of justice.
Prominent scholar Liu Wei once summarized the impact
and effect of the PSS in the following way. First, China’s reforms
of its judicial system and judicial working mechanisms
unavoidably require the introduction of more public supervision
over the judicial process to ensure justice. The PSS may
effectively urge the Procuratorates to subordinate their work
pursuant to due procedure and process. Second, the PSS
becomes the inevitable creation of Chinese authorities’ policies
to promote active civic participation in the justice system. A
number of foreign countries have recently adopted a variety of
systems by which civilians are encouraged to participate in legal
decision-making, thereby eradicating the professional monopoly

66 . The Supreme Procuratorate of China specifically issued the so-called
“Regulations Regarding the Prevention and Correction of illegal extended detention
during the Procuratorial Process” in 2003, which has partially witnessed the abovenamed illegal detention problem; for the phenomenon of extortion of confession by
torture, see high-profile cases on China’s main news websites such as “The Police
Officer Lei Ting’s Torture Case.” [The Police Officer Lei Ting’s Torture Case], SINA.COM
(Sept. 16, 2011, 6:54 AM), http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2011-09-16/065423164313.
shtml.
67. Chen Weidong & Sun Hao, The Research Report on the Operation of the People’s
Supervisor System, 5 J. NAT’L INST. PUB. PROSECUTORS CHINA 81 (2011).
68. [The People’s Supervisor System], BAIDU.COM, http://baike.baidu.com/view/
852736.htm (last visited on Feb. 3, 2014).
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of the judicial and prosecutorial duties. 69 The Chinese
government also realized that the professionalization of the
judiciary had widened the distance between the community and
the judicial process and undermined the perceived credibility of
China’s criminal justice institutions. Not only does the PSS
promote active citizen participation in the administration of
justice, but it also allows the public to observe and assess the
activities of Procuratorate personnel and prosecutorial decisionmaking processes. Third, the PSS becomes the formally
established, external institution which is placed outside the
influence of Procuratorate division. The PSS is solely composed
of citizens chosen from local communities. Putting the
prosecutorial power under people’s close supervision provides
an effective deterrent to the potential abuse and misuse of
prosecutorial power and authority.
B. The Evolution of the PSS and the Nation-Wide Implementation
SPC Chief Prosecutor Jia Chunwang proposed the
establishment of the external supervisory system over China’s
Procuratorates. In April 2003, the SPC decided to begin
exploring the possibility of implementing the PSS.70 On August
29,2003, the SPC held a conference to formulate the pilot study
of the PSS. In October 2003, the SPC finally began the pilot
work of the PSS in ten provinces and municipalities, including
Fu Jian, Sichuan, Heilongjiang, Liao Ning, Tian Jin, Inner
Mongolia, Hebei, Shan Dong, Zhe Jiang, and Hu Bei.71
To facilitate the pilot study, the SPC enacted “The
Regulations Regarding Implementing the PSS in Criminal Cases
Directly Investigated by Procuratorates (Provisional)” on
October 15, 2003 (the “Regulations 2003”). The SPC held two
workshops in Beijing and Chengdu in January and May to
further facilitate the pilot program through exchanging
69. See Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems as Deliberative
Agents of Social Change: De-Colonial Strategies and Deliberative Participatory Democracy, 86
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789 (2011); Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, Jury Selection and Jury Trial in Spain:
Between Theory and Practice, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585 (2011); Stephen Thaman,
Questions of Fact and Law in Russian Jury Trials: The Practice of the Cassational Courts Under
the Jury Laws of 1864 and 1993, 72 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT PÉNAL 415 (2001).
70. [The People’s Supervisor System], supra note 68.
71. Id.
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information, sharing experiences, and analyzing the problems
they encountered in the program.
After the workshops, the People’s Supervisor Office was
established under the General Office of the SPC and began to
collect information and data from the pilot studies on a monthly
basis, such as the selection and appointment of the people’s
supervisor, their performances, and the types of cases in which
they participated. The People’s Supervisor Office also regularly
distributed reports to strengthen communications among
different Procuratorates and offer the SPC’s suggestions and
recommendations on the PSS operation. By the end of 2004, the
pilot study helped select a total of 18,962 people’s supervisors to
participate in the pilot program and these Chinese citizens
supervised the conclusion of 3341 criminal cases.72
In 2006, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China issued “The Decision to Further Strengthen the Work of
the People’s Courts and the People’s Procuratorates” and
reaffirmed China’s supreme authorities’ strong commitment to
the PSS. The Procuratorates in He Bei, Inner Mongolia,
Heilongjiang, Jiang Su, Fu Jian, Shan Dong, Hunan, and
Guangxi provinces first tried to facilitate the PSS’s formal
institutionalization.73 The local Procuratorates in Tianjin, Hebei,
Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Hubei, Sichuan, and Yunnan
also established their own People’s Supervisor Office to
specifically administrate the implementation of the PSS. 74 In
2006, all Procuratorates that had previously run the pilot
program created the working mechanism to collect and archive
information on PSS cases in order to further strengthen the
effective civic supervision of prosecutorial personnel and their
activities.
In 2007, the SPC conducted a series of nationwide
fieldworks in order to analyze and assess the difficulties found in
the pilot program.75 In 2008, the SPC also collected feedback
and suggestions from various Procuratorates with respect to the
72. STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFFICE, BUILDING OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN CHINA
(2005), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Oct/145718.htm#11 (the
excerpt is found in the section, “System of people’s supervisors”).
73. [The People’s Supervisor System], supra note 68.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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selection and appointment of the people’s supervisors, their
performance, and supervisory activities. The State Council of
China also issued a white paper titled Building of Political
Democracy in China, which specifically commended the PSS:
People’s supervisors are selected at the recommendation of
various organs, groups, institutions and enterprises, with
such major duties as conducting independent appraisals
and submitting supervisory comments on cases the
procuratorial organs have directly placed on file for
prosecution but have later decided to withdraw or halt the
prosecution of, and in cases of refusal to submit to arrest.76

The white paper further extends the power of supervisors to
examine duty crimes, in which the supervisors “participate,
upon invitation, in other law-enforcement examination activities
organized by the people’s Procuratorates regarding crimes
committed by civil servants, and make suggestions and
comments on violations of law and discipline discovered.”77
In 2008, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China again requested the collection of information and data
from the pilot work. The purpose was to push this system’s
legalization, define the procedural activity of the people’s
supervisor, improve the administration of selection and
appointment processes, and enhance the PSS’s oversight
functions and efficiency.78
After seven years’ worth of pilot study, the forty-fifth
conference of the eleventh Procuratorial Committee of the SPC
approved The Regulations Regarding the Application of the PSS
of the Supreme Procuratorate of China (the “Regulations
2010”) on October 26, 2010. The SPC then issued a notice to
promulgate the Regulations 2010 and implemented the civic
oversight institution in the whole country.79

76.
77.
78.
79.

STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFFICE, supra note 72.
Id.
[The People’s Supervisor System], supra note 68.
Id.
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III. CIVIC REVIEWS OF PROSECUTORS’ NON-INDICTMENT
DECISIONS
This Section examines the civic review of prosecutors’ nonindictment decisions in Japan and China. Two criminal cases
reviewed by the PRC in Japan include: (1) the FukuchiyamaLine derailment accident; and (2) the killing of an Okinawa
youth by US military personnel. The criminal cases reviewed by
the PSS in China include: (1) a bribery of a public official by a
corporate executive; and (2) the dereliction of duties by police
officers.
A. The PRC and Lay Adjudication of Non-Indictment Cases in Japan
1. The Fukuchisen Derailment Incident
Japan’s most explosive case on the disagreement between
the prosecutorial decision and the PRC’s deliberative outcome
involves the 2005 train derailment that killed 107 people and
injured 555 others. The train derailment occurred on April 25,
2005, on the West Japan Railway (“JR West”) Fukuchiyama Line
in Hyogo Prefecture. The crowded morning train took a tight
curve at excessive speed and slammed into a high-rise residential
complex. Five of the seven cars derailed, and both the first and
second cars slammed into an apartment building near the
tracks. The first car crashed into a multi-story parking garage on
the ground floor of the apartment and was compacted to half its
original length, while the second car rammed into the building
wall and was fractured into an L shape.80
JR West operates in western Honshu, the main and largest
island of Japan, and is one of Japan’s largest corporations. While
JR West has been listed on all major stock markets, including the
Tokyo Stock Exchange, the company has also been burdened by
huge debt sustained before the privatization of the Japanese
National Railways (“JNR”) in 1987. Its managerial team has

80. JR West, Victims’ Relatives Mark Amagasaki Crash, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 26, 2005,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2005/10/26/national/jr-west-victims-relativesmark-amagasaki-crash/#.U26ksYFdWSo.
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been known to be highly aggressive and concentrated on
operations, with profit making being the highest priority.81
On July 8, 2009, the prosecutors indicted the JR West
President Masao Yamazaki after concluding that the tragedy
could have been prevented if the curve had been equipped with
the Automatic Train Stop (“ATS”) system that could have halted
the train. He was indicted on charges of professional negligence
resulting in deaths and injuries. 82 Yamazaki made the
announcement, on the same day of his indictment, that he
would resign his post, while he continued to remain on the JR
West’s Board of Directors.83
The prosecutors also decided not to indict former JR West
executives in charge of safety measures, three former managers,
and the twenty-three-year-old driver who was killed in the
wreck.84 In August, families of victims submitted a complaint to
the Kobe PRC, indicating that JR West past presidents should be
indicted because of their collateral failure to install an advanced
version of the ATS system at the site.85 On October 22, the Kobe
PRC decided that three past presidents of the JR West should be
indicted and submitted their recommendation to the Kobe
Prosecutor’s Office.86 The Kobe PRC also determined that the
major factor contributing to the accident was the company’s
management policy that made profits, not the safety of its
customers, the “firm’s top priority.”87
On December 4, after brief investigative work on the case,
the Kobe prosecutors announced that they would not indict
81. JR West to Pay 44.4 Bil. Yen Under New Legislation, HIGHBEAM BUS. (Nov. 12,
1998),http://business.highbeam.com/435559/article-1G1-53249649/jr-west-pay-444bil-yen-under-new-legislation.
82. JR West President Indicted Over Crash, JAPAN TIMES, July 9, 2009, http://
archive.today/DTEY.
83. He was later acquitted. See Editorial, Former President’s Acquittal Doesn’t Lessen
JR’s Responsibility for Disaster, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Jan. 12, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/
article/views/editorial/AJ201201120048.
84. JR West President Indicted Over Crash, supra note 82.
85. Amagasaki Crash Kin Push for Charges, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/08/22/national/amagasaki-crash-kin-push-forcharges/#.U26l4IFdWSo.
86. Crash Inquest Panel: Indict Ex-JR West Heads, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/10/23/national/crash-inquest-panel-indict-ex-jrwest-heads/#.U26mIIFdWSo.
87. Editorial, JR West’s Actions Show Lack of Remorse, Resolve, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct.
24, 2009, http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/3576007.

2014]

PEOPLE'S GRAND JURY PANELS

951

three former presidents, indicating that these presidents bear no
direct responsibility for instituting an advanced version of the
ATS system at the curb of the derailment.88
In January, victims’ families filed another complaint
regarding the prosecutors’ non-indictment decisions against the
three JR West presidents.89 On January 19, 2010, regarding the
two former transportation managers, the Kobe PRC rendered a
“the non-indictment is improper” decision and sent the
recommendation to the prosecutors. 90 Regarding the three
former JR West presidents, however, the PRC summoned
victims’ families and solicited their opinions on the case.91 The
prosecutors were also summoned to explain the non-indictment
decision and their own investigation on the case.92
On March 26, 2010, the Kobe PRC decided for the second
time that the three former JR West presidents should be
indicted for professional negligence resulting in deaths and
injuries. 93 On April 23, 2010, three court-appointed lawyers
formally filed charges against the three presidents for their
failure to take railway safety measures, thereby causing the fatal
train derailment.94
In March 2013, the trial of three past presidents began at
the Kobe District Court.95 The lawyers who acted as prosecutors
88. JR Nishi no Rekidai 3 Shacho, Futatabi Fukisoni, Dassenjiko de Kobe Chisai [NonIndictment Again for Three Past JR West Presidents, on the Derailment Incident, by the Kobe
Prosecutors], NIKKEI NET, Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/main/20091204
AT5C0401S04122009.html.
89 . Fukuchiyamasen Dassenjiko: Kensatsu Shinsakai Izoku kara Ikenchoshu
[Fukuchiyama Derailment Accident: The PRC Listens to Victims’ Families], EXCITEBLOG,
(Feb. 25, 2010), http://u23pbzpv.exblog.jp/10103774/ [hereinafter Fukuchiyamasen].
90 . Moto Unyu Bucho Fukisowa Futo [Improper Non-Prosecution for Former
Transportation Managers], JICHI TSUSHIN, Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=
201001/2010012900757.
91. Fukuchiyama-sen Jiko: JR Nishi Rekidai 3 Shacho no Kisogiketsu: Kobe Daiichi
Kensatsu [Fukuchiyama-Line Derailment Incident: Kobe PRC Decides on Indictment Against
Three JR-West Presidents], MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 26, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/
jiken/news/20100326k0000e040081000c.html.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. JR Nishi no Rekidai 3 Shacho o Kyosei Kiso, Apr. 26, 2010, SANKEI NYUSU,
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/trial/100423/trl1004231600009-n1.htm.
95. Mottomo Omoi Kei o: Izokura Genkei ni Tsuyoikitai [Heaviest Penalty, Please’
Expectation for Severest Penalty by Victims’ Families], SANKEI NEWS-WEST, Mar. 27, 2013,
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/west/west_affairs/news/130327/waf13032712010009n1.htm.
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under the revised PRC Law sought three-year terms for each of
them, arguing that the three defendants “‘cannot evade
criminal responsibility’ for the accident because they prioritized
business interests over ensuring the safety of the passengers.”96
The testimony revealed that one of the key reasons that “the
driver was speeding was because he overshot his time at the
previous station and was making up for it to keep up with the
pressure of the very strict timetable that JR West follows.”97 The
busy train schedules were specifically created during the terms
of these three former presidents. 98 In September, the threejudge panel acquitted the three former presidents of the charge
of professional negligence of their duties.99
While the PRC’s decision condemned the company’s
corporate culture and management policies that put profit as
the company’s first priority, the court indicated that the driver
was at fault for failing to brake at the curve and that, at the time
of accident, the company was not yet required to install the
computerized ATS system, and even then, derailment accidents
caused by high speeds were a rare occurrence. 100 The court
decision refused to determine corporate culpability in the
accident and put the blame upon the driver, who had died in
the crash.101
2. The Killing of an Okinawa Youth by US Military Personnel102
In January 2011, a vehicle driven by a twenty-three-year-old
US military employee, Rufus J. Ramsey III, from an Army and
96. Ida Torres, EX-JR West Heads Could Get 3 Years in Jail for 2005 Train Crash,
JAPAN DAILY PRESS (Mar. 28, 2013), http://japandailypress.com/ex-jr-west-heads-couldget-3-years-in-jail-for-2005-train-crash-2826009 (quoting the lawyers).
97. Ida Torres, Ex-JR West Presidents Acquitted over 2005 Fukuchiyama Train Disaster,
JAPAN DAILY PRESS (Sep. 27, 2013), http://japandailypress.com/ex-jr-west-presidentsacquitted-over-2005-fukuchiyama-train-disaster-2736745/.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. In October 2013, prosecutors filed an appeal with the Osaka High Court. See
Faith Aquino, Prosecutors Appeal Against the Acquittal of Former JR West Executives, JAPAN
DAILY PRESS (Oct. 8, 2013), http://japandailypress.com/prosecutors-appeal-against-theacquittal-of-former-jr-west-executives-0837311. The high court has yet to rule on the
appeal, as of January 27, 2014.
102. Beigunzoku, Kisosoto Chiikyotei ga Hikokusekini [‘Indictment is Proper’ for Military
Employee: SOFA is on Defendant’s Seat], OKINAWA TIMES, May 29, 2011.
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Air Force Exchange Service (“AAFES”) in Okinawa, swerved
into oncoming traffic, striking a compact car and killing the
nineteen-year-old driver Koki Yogi, who had just returned to his
hometown in Okinawa to attend the official adulthood
ceremony of his twentieth birthday organized by the local
municipal government.103 Ramsey was on his way home after he
had consumed alcohol at an official party at the military base
prior to the accident.104
After the investigation by the Naha District Prosecutors
Office, prosecutors announced that they would not indict
Ramsey because the accident occurred while he was still on
official duty, citing Article 17 of the US-Japan Status of Forces
Agreement (“SOFA”) that gave the US military the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over all accidents or crimes
committed while on official duty. 105 The US military then
decided to punish Ramsey for the accident and revoked his
driving privileges for five years.106
Yogi’s mother soon filed a complaint with the Naha PRC in
order to review the prosecutors’ non-indictment decision.107 The
PRC was composed of eleven citizens chosen from among
Okinawa’s residents. In May, the Naha PRC reversed the
Japanese prosecutors’ refusal to indict Ramsey, determining that
the indictment was proper for the given case. The PRC cited the
103. Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Sumida, AAFES Employee Indicted in Fatal Collision,
STARS & STRIPES (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/news/aafes-employeeindicted-in-fatal-collision-1.161616.
104. Drinking at USF ‘Official Event’ Is Regarded as Part of ‘Official Duty, JAPAN PRESS
WKLY. (Apr. 24 & 26, 2011), http://www.japan-press.co.jp/modules/news/index.php
?id=1784.
105. See id. The term, SOFA (or US-Japan SOFA in this Article), refers to the
Agreement under Article VI of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and
the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United
States Armed Forces in Japan. See Agreement Between the United States of America
and Japan Concerning New Special Measures Relating to Article XXIV of the
Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and
the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 25, 2008, Temp.
State Dep’t No. 08-36, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
108914.pdf.
106. See Tritten & Sumida, supra note 103.
107 . Beigunzoku Fukiso Izoku, Kenshin ni Fufuku Mōsitate [Victim’s Family File
Complaint to the PRC Against the Non-Indictment of American Military Employee], RYUKYU
SHIMPO (Apr. 25, 2011), http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-176467-storytopic111.html.

954 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:929
1960 US Supreme Court decision that excluded the civilian
employees and contractors of US military bases and dependents
of military service members from military rules and regulations
governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the
“UCMJ”), thereby excluding Ramsey from the privileges granted
under the SOFA provision.108 The PRC also reasoned that the
NATO SOFA signed with European countries similarly extends
no right for the US military to exercise its jurisdiction over
civilian military employees during peacetime. 109 Furthermore,
the US government promulgated the Military Extra-Territorial
Jurisdiction Act (the “MEJA”) in 2000, specifying that the
federal, not the military, court has the right to exercise its
jurisdiction over military employees’ crimes during peacetime.110
Meanwhile, friends of the victim and grassroots
organizations in Okinawa created the support group called Yogi
Koki-kun no Izoku o Sasaerukai (the Support Group for the
Survivors of Mr. Koki Yogi), collected signatures from the public,
began to protest against the prosecutors’ non-indictment
decision, and demanded the immediate modification of the
Japan-US SOFA over the jurisdictional provision.111
On November 23, the Japanese and US governments
announced that they had reached a new agreement that allowed
Japanese courts to try civilian military employees even if they

108. Kōtsushibōjiko Beigunzoku wa Kiso-Sotō Kenshin Irei-Genkyū Chiikyōtei Kaiseio
[Traffic Accident Death: American Military Employee be Indicted: PRC’s Unusual Comments for
Urging the SOFA Modification], JIDAN-NAVI (July 16, 2011), http://www.jidan-navi.com/
jidan_news/000727.html.
109 . Beigunzoku Fukiso Jiken, ‘Nihon ni Senzokuteki Saibanken Arieru’ [American
Military Employee’s Non-indictment Case: ‘Japan Has the Rights to Exercise Its Jurisdiction’],
FUKUCHI-GYOSEI JIMUSHO (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.office-fukuchi.jp/article/1417
6861.html (citing the article from Okinawa Times about the ruling of the Korean
Supreme Court Case involving the adjudication of crimes committed by an American
military employee).
110. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–
3267 (2012); Chifuyu Hiyama, Gunzoku no Keiji saiban Kankatsuken [Criminal Court’s
Jurisdiction Over Military Employees] 48, REFERENCE (Apr. 2013), available at http://
dl.ndl.go.jp/view/download/digidepo_8200261_po_074703.pdf?contentNo=1.
111. Nichibei Chiikyōtei Kaisei Motome Gaimu-Daijinni Yōsei-e Izoku o Sasaeru-Kai
[Demand to Modify Japan-U.S. SOFA: Survivor’s Support Group Submit Petition to Minister of
Foreign Affairs], RYUKYU SHIMPO (Dec. 9, 2011), http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid185029-storytopic-1.html.

2014]

PEOPLE'S GRAND JURY PANELS

955

were on official duty at the time of a crime or accident.112
Specifically, the new agreement allows US authorities to, first,
determine whether or not they will bring criminal prosecution
to a case and, second, notify the Japanese side of their decision.
If US authorities decide not to prosecute their personnel, the
Japanese authorities can then request a trial within thirty days
after the US notification.113 Two days after the new agreement
was reached, the Naha prosecutors’ office indicted Ramsey, who
worked at a supermarket inside Camp Foster. 114 In February
2012, the Okinawa court sentenced Ramsey to eighteen months
in Japanese prison for vehicular manslaughter.115
In this case, the prosecutor’s office in Okinawa never
publicly responded to the PRC’s first recommendation for the
prosecution. Instead, the Japanese government technically “took
over” the case and began directly negotiating with the US
military as to the proper disposition of the US military employee
whose juridical rights were “protected” by the SOFA. If the
Okinawa prosecutors had responded to the PRC decision and
issued the non-prosecution decision for the second time, the
deceased’s mother would have certainly filed another complaint
to the Naha PRC for a review, and then the Naha PRC would
have issued the second and binding decision on the prosecution.
This would then have led to an inevitable legal controversy over
international disputes concerning the right to exercise primary
jurisdiction. The bilateral discussion between the Japanese and
the US governments was absolutely necessary to avoid
international legal controversies and politically sensitive
jurisdictional disputes over military personnel and their crimes
committed overseas.

112. Okinawa Prosec Indict US Base Employee, HOUSE JAPAN (Nov. 25, 2011), http://
www.houseofjapan.com/local/okinawa-prosec-indict-us-base-employee.
113. U.S. Civilian Worker in Okinawa Indicted for Fatality, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Nov. 25,
2011), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201111250057.
114. Id.
115. Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Sumida, American on Okinawa Gets 18 Months in
Prison for Vehicular Manslaughter, STARS & STRIPES (Feb. 22, 2012), http://
www.stripes.com/news/pacific/okinawa/american-on-okinawa-gets-18-months-inprison-for-vehicular-manslaughter-1.169343.
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B. The People’s Supervisor System and Lay Adjudication of Criminal
Cases in China
1. Bribery of Public Officials116
After the PSS was established in 2010, people’s supervisors
reviewed a variety of criminal cases. The following case involves
the bribery of a government official by a corporate executive,
and people’s supervisors were asked to review the propriety of
the prosecutor’s non-prosecution decision on the case.
Zhang, the General Manager of the X Electric Company,
bribed Vice-Governor Xu twice, in 2009 and 2011. In return, Xu
provided the X Electric Company the electric project in an
alcohol-liquor trading center in the Y Town. The local
Procuratorate in Sucheng District investigated the case and
concluded that Zhang had indeed bribed Xu and therefore
committed a crime of bribery. According to the Criminal Law of
China, both the company and individuals who conspired and
committed the act of bribery should be properly punished.
Article 142 of the Criminal Procedural Law of China also
stipulates, “with respect to a case that is minor where the
offender need not be subject to criminal punishment or may be
exempted from it under the Criminal Law, the People’s
Procuratorate may decide not to initiate a prosecution.” After
their investigation, the local Procuratorate decided not to
initiate a public prosecution against Zhang because the bribery
committed by Zhang had been “minor” due to a number of
mitigating circumstances, including: (1) the monetary
benchmark for a Procuratorate to place a legal person’s bribery
case on file was CNY¥200,000, while the bribery in this case was
CNY¥300,000, “slightly” above the benchmark; (2) this bribery
case did not cause any substantial economic loss to any party
involved in the illegal scheme; (3) Zhang surrendered himself
on his own initiative and already confessed to his crime and thus
his guilt; and (4) he returned all illegal earnings from this secret
financial transaction.117

116 . Zhu Jianzhong & Wang Yu, The People’s Supervisor Feel Cases’ Pulse,
PROCURATORIAL DAILY, Sept. 23, 2013, at 7.
117. Id.
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According to Article 17 of the Regulations 2010, if a
Procuratorate decides not to initiate a prosecution, the people’s
supervisor will be summoned to review the case. The
Administrative Office of the People’s Supervisor of the Suqian
City Procuratorate randomly selected a panel of three people’s
supervisors (Q, W, and Y) from the candidate list to examine the
bribery case.
During the deliberation, the supervisor W indicated that
the briber deserved a criminal punishment and that his
conviction would set a good example for future lawbreakers. By
contrast, the supervisor Q, who was a businessman, stated that
the suspect bribed the town governor not for his own personal
gain but for the sake of his company’s economic welfare, and
running a company has become increasingly difficult today due
to severe market competitions. Taking mitigating circumstances
into account, Zhang’s crime, as viewed by the local
Procuratorate, had been “minor” and thus leniency should be
applied. The people’s supervisor Y agreed with Q. Finally, the
majority of the supervisory panel decided on the verdict that
agreed with the local Procuratorate’s decision and concluded
that the non-prosecution against Zhang was a proper decision in
this case.
2. The Dereliction of Police Duties118
On March 15, 2005, prisoner Chen, who had received a tenyear imprisonment sentence, was sent to the hospital for
medical treatment of his injured hands. Two police officers, M.
Wang and Y. Wang, were dispatched to watch over the prisoner.
The police officers cuffed Chen’s feet at the hospital, but not his
injured hands. The officers then failed to follow the proper
protocol to monitor and watch over Chen. In the evening of
April 1, both officers left their watching position to have their
dinner, leaving Chen alone in the ward of the hospital. The
prisoner soon destroyed the cuff with a brick and escaped the
hospital, though he was caught the next morning.

at 5.

118. The People’s Supervisor Handled A Bribery Case, JIANGNAN TIMES, Mar. 6, 2008,
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Chapter IX of the Criminal Law of China for the
Crime of Dereliction of Duty and Article 400 stipulates
that:
a judicial officer who, due to serious negligence of his duty,
causes a suspect for a crime, defendant or criminal in
custody to escape shall be sentenced to a fixed-term
imprisonment of not more than three years of criminal
detention if a serious result is not caused; and if an
especially serious result is caused, to a fixed-term
imprisonment of not less than three years and not more
than ten years.

The local Procuratorate initiated the criminal investigation on
April 13 and ended it on May 8, and the case was forwarded to
the Prosecution Department of the local Procuratorate. The
Prosecution Department examined the case and held that two
police officers failed to properly perform their duties and left
their watching positions concurrently without proper
authorization, which resulted in the prisoner’s escape. However,
the Prosecution Department decided not to prosecute the two
suspects by classifying this case as “minor,” taking into account
the mitigating circumstances, including: (1) the prisoner was
arrested the next day, and he did not engage in action that
caused any significant societal harms; (2) the two officers
reported on their own initiative about the prisoner’s escape; and
(3) they already admitted their guilt.
As stipulated by Article 17 of the Regulations 2010, this case
was put under review by a people’s supervisor panel composed
of five supervisors. The prosecutorial personnel reported to
people’s supervisors about the facts, evidences, applicable laws
of the case, information on mitigating circumstances, and
evidence on any serious results related to personal injury and/or
property loss in the case. After the deliberation, four supervisors
made a verdict against the local Procuratorate’s non-prosecution
decision, while one waived his/her rights to vote on this issue.
Four supervisors unanimously held that two suspects were
irresponsible in failing to uphold their duties and should be
prosecuted.
Article 33 of the Regulations 2010 provides that the
Procuratorate handling the case shall examine the opinions and
decision presented by the supervisory panel. If the chief
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prosecutor disagrees with the decision of the supervisory panel,
the case shall be submitted to the Procuratorial Committee of
the local Procuratorate for further discussions and a final
decision. In this case, the supervisor panel composed of five
people’s supervisors disagreed with the proposal made by the
Prosecution Department of the local Procuratorate who planned
not to initiate a prosecution against the two derelict police
officers, while the Chief Prosecutor of the local Procuratorate
disagreed with the verdict presented by the supervisory panel.
This case was thus subsequently submitted to the
Procuratorial Committee of the local Procuratorate for
discussion and final decision. After hearing the reports by the
prosecutorial personnel and the opinions of the people’s
supervisors, most members of the Procuratorial Committee held
that the prisoner who escaped the hospital had previously
committed serious crimes and had received a ten year prison
sentence, and that the irresponsible actions of the two officers
who had allowed such a dangerous prisoner to escape should
constitute a serious dereliction of their police duties. The
Procuratorial Committee thus approved the verdict of the
people’s supervisors, and the local Procuratorate, under the
final decision of the Procuratorial Committee, then initiated a
prosecution against the two police officers.
While the three-member supervisory panel of the bribery
case agreed with the Procuratorate’s decision not to prosecute a
business executive, the five-member supervisory panel that
evaluated public servants’ crimes ruled against the nonprosecution decision made by local prosecutors. Did the
makeup of the supervisory panel contribute to the difference in
verdicts? Did the socio-political background of people’s
supervisors influence the verdict patterns? How was the
candidate list of people’s supervisors assembled and
constructed? The following Part examines some unique
characteristics of grand jury systems adopted in East Asia and
assesses the selection and appointment procedures as to
whether or not the panel of grand jurors represents a fair crosssection of the communities, thereby influencing the nature of
deliberations and thus the verdicts.
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IV. UNIQUE FEATURES OF TWO GRAND JURY SYSTEMS IN
JAPAN AND CHINA
This Part identifies and examines important features of
grand jury systems adopted in Japan and China. First, we
examine the ability of these civic panels to institute an effective
check over prosecutorial power and authority. The second subsection focuses on the selection of civil panels and examines
their representativeness. While the candidates for Japan’s PRC
are required to be chosen from local electoral rolls, a candidate
list of China’s PSS is constructed through a series of solicitations
for supervisor candidates from various governmental organs,
groups, institutions, and private enterprises. 119 The
representative disparity of civic panels, if any, is the focus of the
second sub-section.
A. People’s Check on Prosecutorial Power and Authority
The most significant difference between the two grand jury
systems adopted in Japan and China and the US-style grand jury
system is that the former institutions are specifically designed to
review and examine the propriety of the decisions made by the
prosecutor. Specifically, the grand jurors in East Asia examine
criminal cases that prosecutors have decided not to prosecute.
Their verdicts can potentially challenge and even reverse the
decision made by the prosecutor.
The United States’ grand jury system, on the other hand,
rests on the assumption that a panel of local residents is asked to
make an indictment decision based on evidence presented and
produced by the prosecutor. No defense attorney is present in
the grand jury proceeding. Grand jurors have little to no
authority to challenge or investigate the authenticity of
prosecutorial evidence in terms of how it is collected and how
witnesses are identified and prepared for testimony. Thus, most
grand jury decisions in the United States usually result in the
indictment of the accused as requested by the prosecutors. In
Arizona, for example, in 1994, the federal grand juries returned

119. STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFFICE, supra note 72 (“People’s supervisors are
selected at the recommendation of various organs, groups, institutions and enterprises
. . . .”).
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indictment decisions in 99.6% of the cases.120 In Georgia, grand
jurors vote in favor of indictment in 90% of the cases.121 The
high rate of indictment decisions is a reason that the grand jury
in the United States has been referred as a so-called “rubberstamp” institution.
Two East Asian grand juries, however, pay no attention to
already indicted cases, or are not involved in making an
indictment decision in the first instance. Rather, their
involvement concerns the critical evaluation of the prosecutor’s
failure or “refusal” to issue an indictment decision. As stated
earlier, nearly all indicted cases in Japan result in criminal
conviction.122 China has a nearly identical criminal conviction
rate.123 In 2009, for example, one year prior to the nation-wide
implementation of the PSS, China had a conviction rate of
99.9%. 124 In 2013, China convicted more than 840,000
defendants, and found 2162 defendants not guilty (99.8%).125
Once the prosecutorial process is initiated in both countries, the
conviction becomes a matter of reality for nearly all criminal
suspects and defendants. The near-perfect conviction rate also
implies that the potential abuse and misuse of prosecutorial
power lies in the exercise of their discretion in decisions not to
prosecute individuals, groups, or organizations that are
suspected of criminal offenses and illegal activities. The
prosecutor’s “failure” to issue an indictment or the prosecutor’s
120. A.O. Kime, The Arizona Country Grand Jury, A Former Grand Juror’s Assessment of
the Grand Jury System, MATRIX MNEMOSYNE, http://www.matrixbookstore.biz/grand_
jury.htm (last visited May 2, 2014) (“In a shocking statistical report for fiscal 1994
found the federal grand juries returned indictments in 99.6% of the cases.”).
121. How Does the Grand Jury Work?, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Sept. 25, 2005),
http://savannahnow.com/stories/092505/3317013.shtml.
122. Norimitsu Onishi, Coerced Confessions: Justice Derailed in Japan, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/07/world/asia/07iht-japan.1.5596308.
html?pagewanted=all.
123. Jeff Chinn, Intl. Wrongful Convictions: China Suspects Presumed Guilty Before
Trial, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 20, 2013), http://californiainnocence
project.org/blog/2013/05/20/intl-wrongful-convictions-china-suspects-presumedguilty-before-trial (reporting the Guardian article, indicating that 99.9% of China’s
criminal cases in 2009 ended in convictions).
124. Patrick Boehler, Supreme People’s Court Judge Urges End to Wrongful Convictions,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article/1232279/supreme-peoples-court-judge-urges-end-wrongful-convictions.
125. Concerns Over 98% Chinese Conviction Rate, SCOTSMAN (Jan. 25, 2014), http://
www.scotsman.com/news/world/concerns-over-98-chinese-conviction-rate-1-485728.
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“refusal” to initiate the prosecution against the suspected party
may be caused by many factors, including the sheer lack of
material and/or forensic evidence, the refusal of a key witness to
testify, as well as extra-judicial pressures and/or political
interference from private sectors, corporations, fellow
prosecutors, government executives, or strong advocacy groups,
i.e., public and private interest groups.
The provision of Shobun Seikun in Japan provides an
excellent example of how political pressures from government
executives affect the prosecutorial decision-making process. This
legal provision, for example, allows a complete administrative
“takeover” of the case by prosecutorial executives and has
resulted in the dismissal of many political cases.126 For public
prosecutors to initiate any action against influential bureaucrats,
political party members, or local government leaders, the
Prosecutor General must receive an order from the Ministry of
Justice to investigate and file a formal charge against them.127
Thus, the Public Prosecutors Office becomes directly subject to
a politician who happens to be the Minister of Justice, who is
also appointed by the Prime Minister of the same political party.
In political cases, partisan politics and ministerial influences and
interference are inevitably present in the process of making the
final indictment decision.
Despite the prosecutor’s limitation in not prosecuting
government bureaucrats and party elites for political reasons,
Japan’s prosecutors still have tremendous power and authority,
even more than their US counterparts. Their power to
investigate to prosecute covers nearly all phases of the criminal
justice process and thus has the potential for abuse and misuse.
For example, Japanese prosecutors have the power to terminate
or initiate the prosecutorial process, without the need to go
through a criminal grand jury or similar screening mechanism
as required in the United States; the authority to interrogate and
even extract confessions from the accused or defendant in most
criminal cases; the power to lead investigations from the
discovery of a crime; the power to control access to evidence by

126. DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN
JAPAN 131 (2001).
127. Id.
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defendants and their attorneys; and the authority to appeal
acquittals rendered by court or lay judges.128
China’s prosecutors similarly enjoy a wide range of
unfettered power and authority. Unlike public prosecutors in
the United States or other western legal jurisdictions, the
Chinese Procuratorates’ work is not limited to prosecutorial task
or duty. Chinese Procuratorates enjoy power not only to
conduct criminal investigations, but also to exercise supervision
of other criminal justice managers and institutions, including
the police, prisons, detention facilities, and reform-throughlabor institution activities.129 Chinese Procuratorates also hold
power to supervise even the courts to ensure that their judicial
activities confirm to law. 130 Chinese Procuratorates, in other
words, exercise significant power and authority to supervise
criminal, civil, and administrative trials.131
It is no surprise that a powerful trans-national organization,
or even prominent domestic political institutions such as the
United States-led SCAP in post-war Japan, and the National
Congress of the Communist Party of China, the highest political
organ in China, recognized the danger of potential abuse of
power and authority by the prosecutors. In a sense, the
emergence of two grand jury systems in Japan and China may
have been the inevitable consequence of political concerns
about the potential abuse of prosecutorial power and authority.

128. Kent Anderson, The Japanese Way of Justice: An Up-Close Look at Japan’s Jack
McCoy: A Review of the Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L.
& POL’Y J. 169, 173 (2003).
129. [Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates] art. 5 (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980,
amended by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1983); Civil
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 14 (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008).
130. Jingjing Liu, China’s Procuratorate in Environmental Civil Enforcement: Practice,
Challenges & Implications for China’s Environmental Governance, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 47
(2001).
131. Id.
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B. The Selection and Appointment of the PRC and People’s Supervisors
1. Japan’s PRC Selection
In Japan, the Prosecutorial Review Commission Office (the
“PRCO”), a governmental administrative office, is responsible
for the selection of PRC members. The PRCO is located in the
same courthouse in which the PRC deliberation takes place.
Throughout the selection process, the PRCO provides direct
and indirect assistance in the procedural steps leading to the
selection of the final PRC members and its foreperson. To be
qualified for the PRC duty, one must be enlisted in the local
electoral roll, meaning that a PRC candidate must be a Japanese
citizen and over twenty years of age. The PRC Act tries to ensure
that procedural methods and selection mechanisms achieve a
broad and cross-sectional representation among its members.132
The PRC Act specifies that the director of PRCO shall first
determine an approximate number of PRC members needed for
the following year and a specific allocation of prospective PRC
members to be selected from each village, town, and city within
the court’s jurisdiction.133 At the second selection stage, each
allocation of PRC members is reported to the relevant local
electoral administrative commission.134 Prospective members are
divided into four different reserve pools, each consisting of at
least one hundred prospective jurors.135 At this stage, based on
the number of prospective PRC members for each geographical
unit, the election administrative commission selects PRC
candidates from their electoral register, creating “the Proposed
List of PRC Candidates,” and sends this list to the PRCO.136 The
selected candidates are contacted by the election administrative
commission and screened for their qualifications.137
The PRC Act stipulates that PRC members serve on the
commission for six months, with about one-fourth of the eleven
members being replaced every three months. In the actual
selection of PRC members, the director of the PRCO randomly
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

PRC Act, supra note 28, art. 13(2).
Id. art. 9(1).
Id.
Id. art. 9(2).
Id. art. 10(1)–(3).
Id. art. 12(4).
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selects five jury candidates from the first reserve by December
28, six jury candidates from the second reserve by March 31, five
candidates from the third reserve by June 30, and six candidates
from the fourth reserve by September 30 of each year.138
Once PRC members appear at the courthouse, the chief
justice of the court or the superior court judge instructs them
about their duties and administers an oath.139 A PRC foreperson
is then appointed to lead the deliberation.140 The role of the
PRC foreperson is similar to that of the American jury
foreperson who acts as the leader of discussions and
deliberations in criminal and civil jury trials in the United States.
Given the lengthy commitment of PRC duty and the
rigorous selection procedures governing the preparation of the
PRC candidate list and qualified pool, past research has shown
that the composition of PRC members has failed to represent a
fair cross-section of the community. In Japan, a preliminary
study has found that PRC members are more likely to be male
and in their forties and fifties.141 The overwhelming majority of
them were also employed when they served. Many worked for
organizations that continued to pay their salaries, including the
government and large firms. 142 Jury research in the United
States also found that US jurors also tend to be middle-aged,
white-collar workers in a stable primary labor market, and of
higher income, showing similar representative disparities and
social inequities on the basis of age, gender, and social class.143
As for their political affiliation and views, the majority of
PRC members indicated their support of the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (“LDP”) (53.6%).144 In 2006 when the survey
was conducted, the support for the LDP in Japan was a mere
38%, suggesting that many PRC members were politically

138. Id. art. 13(1).
139. Id. art. 16(1)–(4).
140. Id. art. 15(1).
141. Fukurai, supra note 18, at 334–36 (summarizing the research on civic
participation in Japan).
142. Id.
143. HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 64 (1993). See generally HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD
KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY SELECTION (2003).
144. Fukurai, supra note 18, at 334–36.
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conservative. 145 Indeed, nearly one half of PRC members
indicated that they were also conservative in their political views
(48.9%).146
While there is no known study that has examined the
demographics of all PRC members, there may be serious
concerns about the underrepresentation of Japan’s ethnic
minorities such as Burakumins (Japan’s so called untouchables),
Ainus, Koreans, Chinese, Brazilians, and descendants of
immigrant groups from Southeast Asia and the Middle East.147
As the same ethnic groups make up a rather sizable segment of
criminal defendants, it may be important to research the PRC’s
ethnic makeup and explore ethnic diversity of PRC
membership.
2. China’s People’s Supervisors Selection
Article 4 of the Regulations 2010 provides for the
qualifications of the people’s supervisors, which include: (1)
upholding the Constitutional Law of China; (2) having the right
to vote and to be elected; (3) twenty-three-year-old or above; (4)
being fair and honest and holding appropriate educational
levels; and (5) being healthy. Article Five further provides that
the following individuals are not qualified to serve as people’s
supervisors: (1) having a criminal record or being involved in a
criminal procedure as a suspect; (2) having the record of
indoctrination through labor; and (3) being discharged or
nominally expulsed from public employment. Article 6 provides
that the persons below are also unsuitable for people’s
supervisors: (1) principals of the Party Committees, the
governments and the sections thereof; (2) members of the
Standing Committees of the People’s Congress; (3) in-service
staff of the people’s law courts, the people’s Procuratorates,
145. Asahi Shimbun Emergency Opinion Poll on the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Presidential Election, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Sept. 20–21), 2006, available at http://
mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/asian-opinionpoll-database/listofpolls/2006-polls/asahi-shimbun-emergency-opinion-polls-on-theliberal-democratic-party-ldp-presidential-election-06-9 (stating that 35% of citizens said
that “they do not support any party”).
146. Fukurai, supra note 18, at 334–36.
147. See generally JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY (Michael
Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2009) (seeking, in part, to evaluate the construction of the Japanese
identity and the life of minorities in contemporary Japan).
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public security organs, national security organs, or judicial
administrative organs; (4) practicing lawyers and people’s
assessors (China’s jurors); and (5) any others whose posts may
affect their performance of the duties of the people’s
supervisor.148
Articles 7 through 12 of the Regulations 2010 specify the
selecting method of the people’s supervisor. Article 7 provides
that the provincial (municipality) Procuratorate be responsible
for the selection of the people’s supervisors for Procuratorates
of different levels in the same province (i.e., municipality). In
other words, a people’s supervisor for a city-level or regionallevel Procuratorate will be selected and appointed by the
provincial-level Procuratorate, i.e., the administratively superior
Procuratorate. It was expected that the selection of the people’s
supervisors by the Procuratorates at a comparatively higher level
would significantly enhance their authority when they serve at
various local Procuratorates. This vertical selection system also
creates a dilemma that “the supervisees choose supervisors to
supervise the supervisees themselves.”149 This has become one of
the most prominent problems faced by the PSS.
Article 9 of the Regulations 2010 also stipulates that
candidates be identified, either by self-nomination or by
nomination
from
governmental
institutions,
public
organizations, enterprises, and public-service institutions, with
the candidates’ consent. This selection system creates a number
of problems for the sufficient procurement of people’s
supervisors. First, this “nomination” model is premised upon the
assumption that candidates are sufficiently enthusiastic to
nominate themselves for civic duty and that these private and
public institutions are willing to nominate their own employees
or members for people’s supervisors. The Regulations 2010 also
established a five-year tenure for people’s supervisors and allows
one more extended term, if so desired. Such a long tenure (i.e.,
five or even ten years) may scare away potential volunteers from
serving as people’s supervisors. Second, it is doubtful as to
148 . Regulations on the Application of the People’s Supervisor System
(promulgated by the Supreme Procuratorate of China, Oct. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.sx.jcy.gov.cn/rmjdy/201104/t20110429_536760.shtml.
149. Li Li, The People’s Supervisors System Has Not Avoided the Dilemma of “Selfsupervision”, LEGAL DAILY, Mar. 9, 2012.
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whether self-nomination can ensure a sufficient diversity or fair
representativeness for the pool of people’s supervisors. In other
words, a person in full employment will be less likely to
nominate themselves, because once appointed, they will have to
serve for five years and will have to respond to the
Procuratorate’s summons at any time. The role of people’s
supervisors appears more suitable for those without full-time
employment such as pensioners, the unemployed, even the
wealthy with sufficient leisure time, or civil servants who may
easily ask for leave to serve on civic duty. Thirdly, in terms of
employer nomination, it is unlikely that employers will be willing
to lend their employees to the Procuratorates because they still
have to pay their wages while they are serving as supervisors.
Governmental organizations, enterprises and public-service
institutions have been so inactive in nominating candidates that
there have not been sufficient numbers of candidates. The
number of self-nominated candidates has also been extremely
limited. An alternative solution adopted by various
Procuratorates is that the Procuratorates themselves seek
candidates or even “procure” candidates by trying to persuade
people to serve as supervisors. Such a selection method certainly
leads to the loss of randomness or lack of broader
representativeness of the community members. For example, it
has been reported that some Procuratorates tend to choose
employees working at governmental institutions because their
bosses are more likely to deem the civic services as “working for
the state” and easily give their subordinates a leave permit.150
The Supreme Procuratorate has not published the latest
socio-demographic information about supervisors, such as their
occupations, educational levels, gender, and so forth. We,
therefore, can only speculate on these characteristics, based on
published statistical data. According to the report published by
the Supreme Procuratorate of China in 2006, 20,848 people
served as supervisors in China. Among them, 12,520 were the
representatives of the NPC (equivalent to the Upper House) or
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
150. Yang Zhi, The Investigation Report of the People’s Supervisors System—
Sampling the Procuratorates in the Autonomous Region of Hong He Hani and Yi
Ethnic Minorities (May 2008) (unpublished LL.M. degree dissertation) (on file with
the second author).
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(“CPPCC”) (equivalent to the Lower House) (60.1%); 6958 had
law diplomas or degrees (33.4%); and there were only ninetynine workers (0.4%) and 293 farmers (1.4%).151
According to another report from scholar Yang Zhi in
Honghe District of Yunan Province, seventy-eight served as
people’s supervisors in 2007. Among this pool, fifty-seven were
Chinese Communist Party members (73.1%); four were
politically affiliated with other parties (5.1%); and seventeen had
no political affiliation (21.8%). In terms of occupation, fortyeight worked in governmental institutions (61.5%); ten came
from non-governmental organizations (12.8%); sixteen were
from state-owned enterprises or public-service organizations
(20.5%); three were members of grass-root organizations
(3.8%); and there were only two blue-collar workers (2.5%) and
one farmer (1.2%).With respect to their education background
and political affiliation, thirteen graduated from law schools
(16.6%); five had working experience in the legal profession
(6.4%); thirty-two were members of the CPPCC (41.0%); and
one was the representative of the NPC (1.2%).152
These findings suggest the following characteristics of
people’s supervisors: (1) the political accountability of the
people’s supervisors has been much emphasized, and it was
evidenced by the high proportion of Communists, governmental
employees, and representatives from the NPC and the CPPCC in
the pool of people’s supervisors; (2) law school graduates
occupy a considerable proportion of the pool of supervisors,
suggesting that the highly educated have been given preferential
consideration in the process of people’s supervisors’ selection
and that the people’s supervisors are commissioned to supervise
the legality of criminal investigations; and (3) people from
comparatively lower social classes such as blue-collar workers
and farmers are not welcome candidates for people’s
supervisors, which might be attributed to such factors as their
absence of political commitment or their lack of legal
knowledge required for deliberations. In general, the personnel
structure of the people’s supervisors in China tends to draw

151. Id.
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those who are more likely to be senior, elitists in their
professions, and government-affiliated personnel.
CONCLUSION
Both Japan and China recently introduced a new grand jury
institution in their legal system. These two East Asian grand
juries are designed to examine those criminal cases in which
prosecutors have decided not to prosecute the suspect. In Japan
and China, where nearly all of prosecuted cases result in
conviction, the potential abuse and misuse of prosecutorial
power and authority may lie in the exercise of the discretion not
to prosecute individuals, groups, or organizations that are
suspected of illegal activities.
We examined a total of four specific cases in which East
Asian grand jurors reviewed and deliberated. We also identified
unique features of East Asian grand juries as compared to their
American counterparts. The grand juries adopted in Japan and
China had problems with respect to selection and appointment
procedures and we found that the grand jurors were less likely
to reflect a cross-section of the general population. Unlike their
American counterparts, East Asian grand jurors were not chosen
on the basis of rigid randomized design. While Japan’s other lay
participation system, called Saiban-in system (a panel of three
professional and six lay judges), relies on the system of random
selection in identifying the jurors, the PRC has no such strong
mandate regarding the use of randomized method throughout
the selection of grand jurors, i.e., from the identification to the
final stage of appointment at the courtroom. Both selfnomination and individual or institutional referrals have been
used for the selection of China’s people’s supervisors. Because
of the reluctance on the part of self-nominating individuals or
employers to lend their employees to civic duty, the
Procuratorate offices have been proactively soliciting a large
number of supervisors to serve in their cases.
It is advisable to reform the selection process of the grand
jury systems adopted in Japan and China in order to ensure the
randomness of juror selection. If these grand jurors are
primarily selected from certain gender, age, social classes or
political groups, their representativeness will inevitably become
unbalanced and skewed. The selection and appointment
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methods adopted in Japan and China, coupled with a long
serving tenure (i.e., six months for Japan’s PRC members and
five years for China’s supervisors, whose term can be extended
to a total of ten years), is apt to turn the grand jurors’ service
into an avocation enjoyed only by a tiny privileged number of
volunteers who feel happy to be nominated, rather than
ensuring a democratic right and social responsibility enjoyed
and assumed by all of the citizenry.
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